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Introduction
In dealing with unfair terms in Malaysian
consumer contracts, the temptation to take
the well-trodden path of regretting the
absence of a comprehensive consumer
protection legislation and of justifying the
perceived lack of consumer-friendly
provisions in the Contracts Act 1950, by"
tracing its genesis to the hey day of theories
of Natural Law and Laissez Faire, is almost
irresistible. .
We can neither deny nor change the facts of
history. It is a historical fact that the
Contracts Act 1950 (which was based on the
Indian Contract Act 1872) is a product of
19th century social, economic, political and
philosophical influences on the English
judicial thinking of that time.'
Given the above truism, and granted that
generally, the existing legislative
infrastructure in Malaysia may not be the
most ideal for consumer protection, it is the
premise of this paper that more call in fact
be done within the existing legal framework,
to check the use of unfair terms in consumer
contracts, by way of increased judicial
creativity. Provided we are willing to see
the provisions of the Contracts Act for what
they are; uninfluenced by the social,
economic and political climate at the time of
its conception, it will be realised that inspite
of its origins, the Act has unexplored and
unexploited potential in' checking unfair
terms in consumer contracts. Creative use
of the provisions in the Act coupled with
other inherently available judicial armoury,
is in my view, as important and as necessary
as is the introduction of new consumer
protection legislation.
Judicial Treatment of Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts - Some lliustrations:
oR 1-, C~. '_ •
The Contracts Act 1950 attempts to, co¥fy:
,J 1 • -. •
only the basic principles of contract .1~\}';.
As such it does not have specific prQx~~ions
dealing with. the conten~~ or the !wms 'oJ a
contract. Hence no mention is made irithe
I /. I \ ,j ~" .' ! I- J' ,
Act of clauses which, limit 0r.',even, expl?de ,
one, party's, liability, c1auseswb.ich,
incorporate terms in other documents' into '
!;,'
,-
•the contract, clauses whereby the parties
contract out of certain specific statutory
provisions, compulsory arbitration clauses,
the notorious 'basis of contract' clauses in
insurance contracts and the like. It is
perhaps for this reason that the Malaysian
Judiciary has, hitherto, upheld the validity of
clauses that seem to be unfair to consumers.
The absence of specific and stifling
provisions in the Contracts Act 1950
seemed to be regarded, in the majority of
cases, as a carte-blanche to uphold unfair
terms in consumer contracts. Granted that
cases involving unfair terms in consumer
contracts have been fairly limited in
number, the decisions in these cases have
not been extremely satisfactory. This can
be seen in some of the cases considered
below.
1. Exemption Clauses in Standard
Form Contracts
Clauses in standard form contracts which
exemptr limit a contracting party's liability
for certain breaches of the expressed or
implied terms of the contract or for the
commission of a tort, operate extremely
harshly against and to the detriment of
consumers. Such clauses are found at the
back of tickets of public transport, on
receipts and other types of standard form
consumer contracts. The use or rather
abuse of such clauses in standard form
consumer contracts have generally been
viewed as objectionable by the common law
judges, who have as a result introduced or
applied a medley of principles to check,
control or event sometimes circumvent such
clauses. These include the requirement that
the clause must be an integral part of the
contractual document/ and that reasonable
steps have been taken to bring the existence
of the clause to the notice of the contracting
parties before the contract is effected.
Furthermore, various rules of construction
are also readily available as a means of
controlling such exemption clauses such as
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the contra proferentum rule) or the
requirement that very clear words must be
used if one is to be excused from the results
of one's own negligence."
Apart from the fairly traditional tools
mentioned above, newer ones like economic
duress' and inequality of bargaining
power" have also been creatively used in
other jurisdictions.
Thus it is clear that even with the demise of
the concept of fundamental breach in
relation to exemption clauses' there remains
a wide range of judicial tools which can be
used to control the abuse of exemption
clauses in standard form consumer
contracts.
)
Regretfully however, none of the e judicial
tools were used by the MaJaysian Supreme
in the onJy reported Malaysian case which
involved an exemption clau e in a standard
form consumer contract. In Malaysian
Airlines System Bhd v Malini Nathan &
Anar,8 the Malaysian Airlines wa ued for
breach of contract for failing to fly the 1 t
respondent, a fourteen year old pupil in
England at that time, back to Malay ia on a
particular flight although he had a
confirmed ticket on the said flight.
Malaysia Airlines in denying liability relied
on Condition 9 under the Condition of
Contract which was printed on page 2 of the
ticket. Condition 9 stipulated a follow:
"Carrier undertake to u e it
best efforts to carry the
passenger and baggage with
reasonable dispatch. Time
shown in timetable r
elsewhere are not guarant d
and form no p rt f thi
contract. Carrier may
without u titut
alternate carrier
and may alter
stopping place h
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ticket .in case of, necessity.
Schedules are subject to
change without notice.
Carrier assumes no
responsibility for making
connections. "
Considering the extent to which exemption
clauses in consumer contracts have been
placed under judicial scrutiny in England
and elsewhere at the time this case was
decided, the simplistic, approach taken by
the highest court of, the .land in, the only
reported case on exemption clauses in a
consumer contract, is,·most discouraging.While the Sessions Court found in favour of
the respondents, the High Court allowed the
appeal by the Airlines. This was .then
affirmed by the Supreme Court. Delivering
the judgment of· the Supreme Court, Wan
Hamzah SCJ observed:"
2. Contracting~Out Clauses,
,', " \, 'J' I
In my judgment the
defendant's decision not to
carry the first plaintiff on
flight No. MH893 on March
26, was fully covered; .by
Condition No.9. What the
defendant did or omitted to
do was in, accordance with
Condition No. -9, and
therefore there was no breach
of contract on the part of the
defendant. The plaintiffs
ought to have known
Condition 9 and they were
presumed to have known it
as it was printed on the
ticket. Even if it was true
that the defendant had
confmned or represented, to
the plaintiffs that the .first
plaintiff had a definite and
certain booking of a seat on
that flight, it must be
understood that such
confirmation or
representation was made
subject to Condition No.9.
Because it was made subject
to Condition No.9 it cannot
be said that such
confirmation or
representation was made
falsely or recklessly.
Another common feature -of consumer
contracts in Malaysia is the, use of
'contracting-out' clauses i.e. clauses in a
contract whereby the parties.free themselves. ;
from certain statutory obligations.
Judicial treatment of contracting-out clauses
in Malaysia seem to be more favourable to,
consumers compared to the judicial,
treatment of exemption clauses.
While the Privy Council in Ooi Boon Leong
& Ors v Citibank NA 10 has cateforically
recognised the right of parties to contract
out of the .Contracts Act, thereby affirming
the notion-of freedom of contract as the
structural ,foundation of the Act, the courts
seem to be consistent in 1 their view. that .
parties cannot contract-out of specific
statutes which have been introduced to eater:
to the needs of specific groups of people "
and to deal with specific situations.:
. 1 . , ;:-:.
The latter is,' clearly illustrated by ,the
decision of the then Federal Court in SE4,
Housing Corporation Sdn. Bhd v Lee Poh.
Choo.11 The issue in that case was
whether the parties to, a contract could
contract out of the Housing Developers
(Control and Licensing) Rules~·,1970. In
holding that the developer could not rely on
such contracting- out clause to.get around
the Rules" Suffian LP, dehvering , the
judgement of the Federal.Court observed:" .
, t'·. ~ ) ft..; " J
[I]t is clear that o~ i~rms
and conditions designed to
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comply with the requirements
of the rules that may be
inserted in a contract of sale
of land that is governed by
the [Housing Developer
(Control and Licensing)] Act
[1966]] and the rules, and
that on the contrary terms,
and condition which purport
to get round the Act and
rules so as to remove the
protection of home buyers
may not be so inserted.
The Federal Court in fact adopted the
principle enunciated by the House of Lords
in Johnson v Moreton" that where the
weaker contracting party is the subject of
protection by a statute it is no longer
possible to state axiomatically that the courts
will permit contracting-out of provisions in
the absence of explicit language to the
contrary.
A similar stand was taken by the same court
in Lee Kim Seng v Acme Canning Sdn
BhdI4 which involved an attempt to
contract out of certain provisions of the
Employment Ordinance 1955.
Ooi Boon Leong, albeit a more recent
decision and a decision of the Privy Council
must not be regarded as having negated the
effects of the earlier decisions of the Federal
Court. The decision of the Privy Council
pertaining to contracting out must be
confined to attempts to contract out of the
Contracts Act only. Attempts to contract
out of specific statutes must still be viewed
in accordance with the two earlier decisions
of the Federal Court.
The distinction between the Privy Council
decision in Ooi Boon Leong and the two
Federal Court cases must not be blurred in
dealing with contracting-out cIau e in
consumer contracts. This is particularly
important because of late, there are variou
4
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3. Incorporation Clau e
The widespread u of inc
in consumer contra
immediate cone m.
that term and
signed, are deem d t
the contract.
plaintiffs and defendants
rendered themselves bound
by those clauses and
conditions.
The learned judge referred to the English
cases of Queen Insurance Co v William
Parsons" and General Accident, Fire and
Life Assurance' Corporation v Shuttleworth
& Anor.)9 , 'In the former, the Privy
Council in fact went a step further by saying
that where there is an express clause in the
cover note which incorporates the terms and
conditions of the proposed policy, the
insurer is not required to show that they
were brought to the insured's notice or even
that he had had an opportunity of making
himself acquainted with their
requirements."
4. Compulsory Arbitration Clauses
Compulsory arbitration clauses are a
standard feature in contracts of insurance;
Such clauses require a dispute which arises
between the insurer and the insured to be .
referred to arbitration within a specific time .
before the dispute can be brought to court.
These clauses relate to disputes as to
liability as well as quantum.
Unlike in England where the British
Insurance Association and Lloyd's had
declared that their members would not
demand that the insured resort to arbitration
where the dispute "involves the insurer's
liability and the insured does not wish to
rely on arbitration to resolve the dispute,
Malaysian insurers have not given such an
undertaking. Hence failure to fulfil such
arbitration clauses have frequently been used
to deny an insured's claim." The courts
have also endorsed such denial of liability
by holding the failure to refer a dispute to
arbitration fatal to the insured's claim.
While an arbitration process may have its
advantages over litigation vis-a-vis the
consumer.F there are concealed
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5
disadvantages. The fact that a dispute is
considered away from the glare' bf media .
publicity may encourage the stronger party
to use unfair tactics, raise technical defences
and make them less. willing to compromise
as no adverse publicity will be given to
them, unlike in a litigation.
Section 28 of the Arbitration Act 195223
gives the High Court the power to extend
the time, for " aummencingarbitration
proceedings if the court' is of the 'opinion
that undue hardship would otherwise be
caused. Section 28' was in fact most
encouragingly used by the High Court and
endorsed by the Federal Court in Safety
Insurance, Company v Chow Soon Tat.24
The insured who had a fire policy suffered
a loss by fire on December, 30,; 1968 .. ' He
made a claim on January 5, 1969 but the
company remained silent until some 3 112
years later when they informed-the insured's
solicitor that' they: were .repudiating liability
under:C0ridition 119, Qf~'jthe[1.l'oli€y. This
condition. provided tbaHhecompaJi.y was in.
no caselt01be' tiableforany loss or damage.
after the expiration of 12' months 'from! the "
happening-of the loss or damage unless -the '
claim is the subject of pending :action or"
arbitration. Condition 18 of the"policy.,
required all differences arising between the :
parties to be referred to arbitration and that
such was a condition precedent to any other
right of action. ' '~.c i :
III
Clearly the insurance company had, in
keeping silent, an eye on these provisions in
the policy.iMohamed Azmi J however was
quickto detect -this. According to the
learned judge by not disputing. the claim; the
insurer gaver thet.rimpressien that~)'?1ibe
insured's' claim was being. considered. thus,
giving the-insured 'no opportunity to: invoke.
Condition 18. .Further if Condition'.19, were
to be read independently, it would deprive
the insured of his right under the policy.
after one year as there was no pending
action or arbitration. According to the
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learned judge such could not be allowed a
it would tum Condition 19 into a vehicle of
oppression and cause undue hardship to the
insured. The learned judge thus granted the
application for an extension of time under
section 28 of the Arbitration Act. The
insurer's subsequent appeal to the Federal
Court was dismissed.
5. 'Basis of Contract' Clauses in
Insurance Proposal Forms
As contracts of insurance seem to be the
consumer contract that is put under judicial
scrutiny more frequently than others,
inevitably this last illustration of the judicial
treatment of unfair terms also involves
contracts of insurance.
Proposal forms submitted by consumers in
obtaining insurance cover inevitably
contains the notorious 'basis of contract
clause. ' By the use of this clause the
proposer for insurante warrants the truth of
all answers and information given therein
and that any untruth therein would make the
contrct of insurance voidable. The use of
this clause thus provides the insurer with the
means to avoid a policy which is far more
effective than either non-disclosure or
misrepresentation.
In England the harshness of the law relating
to basis of contract clause are often
mitigated by the adoption of strict rules of
interpretation by the courts." Furthermore
by the relveant Statements of Practice,
insurers who are members of the British
Insurance Association and Lloyds have
agreed the "the declaration at the foot of
proposal form should be restricted to
completion according to the propo er'
knowledge and belief and that neither th
proposal form nor the policy shall contain
any provision converting the statemen a
to past or present fact into warrantie .;" 2
In Malaysia, in the absence of imilar
tat m nt p
of the an we
been mad a . it .
'h th r
The
ttit
h in Judi Ial
Granted
requisite for the strict application of the
doctrine of freedom to contract ie equality
of bargaining power, is usually not present
in a consumer contract. This is more so in
Malaysia where the general level of literacy
has not reached 'a stage which we can be
proud of and consumer-awareness is still
even lower. This, coupled with the obvious
inertia of the legislators in either rectifying
existing provisions or introducing new
legislation in the' name of consumer
protection, not merely: demands but in fact
mandates that Ourjudiciary display greater
interventionism in the enforcement of
consumer contracts. Special vigilance is
required when consumer contracts are the
subject matter of litigation; positivistic or
rigid interpretations of existing provisions
must make way for creative use of existing
law.
Perhaps it may not be long before the
Malaysian legislature feel compelled to
introduce comprehensive legislation dealing
with unfair termsjn consumer contracts.
However, even in the absence of such
legislation there is at present sufficient
scope for the exercise of judicial creativity
in dealing with such contracts. The existing
array of devices include those that are
inherently available to the courts and those
that are provided for under the Contracts
Act. An inventory of such devices is
provided below.
Devices Which are Inherently Available
1. The Rules of Construction
Various interpretative devices are frequently
used by courts in other jurisdictions as a
device to protect the interest of consumers
in unfair contracts. These include the strict
interpretation of clauses which exempt or
limit a party's contractual liability" the use
of the contra proferentem rule when the
words used in a contract are vague or
ambigous," the doctrine of repugnancy"
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and the other general rules of construction
of constractual terms.
The Malaysian Courts of late seem to be
fairly reluctant to use any of these devices.
In Kong Ming Bank Bhd v Leong: Ho
Yuen32 a memorandum of. charge executed
. , " f':;! , " ." .
by a customer in favour of a bank in
consideration for overdraft facilities had to
be construed by the court. What had tb be
determined was 'the time from wliich interest
on the overdraft ought to be payable. The
trial judge applied the contra protereniem
rule and construed the clause in favour of
the customer. This was however rejected by
the Federal Court" on the ground thatthis
rule of construction is subject to the
overriding principle that an instrument must
be construed in accordance with the
expressed intention of the parties. The
Federal Court' further observed" that the
application of the contra proferentem rule
may be made only when other rules of
construction fail.
The contra proferemum.rule seem to be
more favourably used by judges in dealing
with contracts of insurance. In Malaysia
National Insurance Sdn Bhd v Abdul Aziz
bin Mohamed Daud" the Federal Court
held":
[A]s between the assured and
the insurers, the exception
clause,"in,.\th~\ proviso, on the
ordinary 'ptlndPles of
constniction'Has 'as' 'far as
possible, to"be read-against
the insurance' company, that
is to say that if there is a
.doubt as to its extent and the
question were' to"arise as to
the liability of the insurers,
the constructron" .\most
favourable "to the" assured
must be given to him,
--
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Apart from the contra projerentem rule the
Malaysian courts have yet to use any of
these devices to deal with unfair terms in
contracts.
2. Device of Collateral Contracts
A common problem in consumer contracts
relate to the status of representations made
during the pre-contract stage in relation to
contracts which are subsequently wholly
reduced to writing. The parole evidence
rule will prevent the introduction of those
oral statements to contradict, vary, add to or
subtract from, the terms of the written
argreement. The rigid application of the
parole evidence rule causes lot of hardShip
to consumers who may have entered into a
written contract based on certain
representations made by or on behalf of the
other party prior to the contract.
This is illustrated in the case of China
Insurance Co Ltd v Ngau Ah Kau.36 A
claim by an insured was rejected by the
insurer because of a misstatement in the
proposal form .. The insured contended that
he had given the correct answer to the
insurance agent but was told that it was
unnecessary to include the said information
in the proposal form. The agent also gave
evidence to this effect. The trial judge
found in favour of the insured on the ground
that as the agent was the insurer's agent,
knowledge of that information could be
imputed to the insurer. This decision wa
unfortunately reversed by the Federal Court.
One of the reasons given by the Federal
Court was that the oral evidence given by
the agent was inadmissible by virtue of
sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act
relating to parole evidence.
Interestingly however, in some other case •
the courts have creatively used other device
to overcome problems with the parole
evidence rule. One such device is collateral
contract - whereby the oral representation i
hi h
hi h is in
The I
rent I.
the written
1 ment.
the
undertakin
occupy the prem
wi bed provid
regularly.
Thea
induces a party to enter into
the contract, overrides any
inconsistent written
agreement. .This device of
collateral contract does not
offend the extrinsic evidence
rule because the oral promise
is not imputed into the main
agrement. Instead it
constitutes a separate contract
which exists side by side
with the main agreement.
The device of collateral contract was also
used by the Federal Court in dealing with a
consumer contract in Tan Chong & Sons
Motor Sdn Bhd v Alan McKnigh.40 The
respondent wanted to buy a car from the
appellant and get the benefit of exemption
from duty in Malaysia and Australia. To be
able to get such benefit he must buy a car
which conformed with the Australian Design
Regulations. This fact was made known to
the appellant's salesman by the respondent
at the pre-contract stage. However the
Buyer's Order which was signed by the
respondent at the time he committed himself
to the purchase of a Datsun 260 from the
appellant had inter alia, Condition 5 which
read:
No guarantee or warranty of
any kind whatsoever is given
by the company in respect of
the vehicle, the subject of the
order, unless such guarantee
and/or warranty is separately
stipulated in writing hereto,
but the BuyerlHirer shall be
entitled to the benefit of the
manufacturers warranty.
The car which was supplied to the
respondent did not conform with the
Australian Design Regulations and the
respondent claimed damages for breach of
warranty. The High Court41 found in
favour of the respondent by hOlding that the
I r:::) r.... v
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contract was partly in writing and partly
oral. According to Gunn Chit Tuan J42:
In this case the [oral]
warranty was really one of
the promises that go to make
up the main contract, which
... was partly oral, partly
written and partly by
conduct.
The learned judge refused to call the oral
warranty a collateral contract because
according to his Lordship such contracts are
rare and are difficult to prove.
However, on appeal, the Federal Court
favoured the collateral contract approach.
According to Salleh Abas FJ43:
In any even whether one
regards these oral·
representations as a separate
agreement or as an integral
part of it or even as a new
term, there is no running
away from the fact that the .
oral representation was
contradictory to the printed
conditions. This conflict did
not in anyway deter the court
from doing justice.
By using the collateral contract device, the
parole evidence rule is effectively avoided.
The Federal Court observed":
[T]he dominant purpose - of
proving . the pre-contract
statements in the case under
the present appeal was not to
contradict, vary, add or
substract the terms of the
[buyer's] Qrder,but to prove
the existence of a warranty, a
separate contractual promise,
although such proof resulted
in a conflcit between the
456
warranty and the terms of the
contract subsequently entered
into.
Salleh Abas FJ displayed extreme judicial
sensitivity and concern when his Lordship
further observed":
It is the need to attach
responsibility upon the maker
of pre-contract statements
that such statement have been
given an overriding effect
despite their defiance of the
terms of a written contract.
I'
In Kandasami v Mustafo" the P r ivy
Council went a step further and agreed with
the specific finding of the trial judge that a
written agreement entered into between the
parties was not binding on the parties as the
parties had only intended to be bound by the
oral agreement entered into earlier. It was
held by the Privy Council on the facts, there
was in existence a collateral agreement
under which the parties had agreed that the
written agreement will have no legal effect.
Delivering the judgment of the Board, Lord
Brightman observed":
If parties put their names to a
document, and one party
represents and the other party
agrees that the document
shall not, as between
.themselves, have any legal
effect so that it exists only to
answer some other purpose,
the law will give effect to
that collateral agreement and
deny the document whatever
legal effect it might othwise
have had.
As opposed to the above mentioned ca
there are also several cases where the cou
have strictly applied the parole evidence rule
and refused to introduce other term which
Granted that the case of Pasuma Pharmacal
involved a commercial rather· than a
consumer contract it is at least a positive
indication that the courts can be persuaded
to imply good faith even in contracts which
do not fall under the category of uberrimae
fides.
Devices Which are Available Under the
Contracts Act 1950
1. Public Policy
-
Section 24 of the Contracts Act 1950
provides that the consideration or object of
an agreement is lawful unless -
(e)
• 54
the court regards It as
immoral, or opposed to
public policy.
Every agreement of which the object or
consideration is unlawful is void.
It is submitted that public policy in this
context should not and cannot be confined to
the common law heads of public policy as
determined by the common law judges.
There are at least two reasons for this.
The first is the fact that most of the
common law heads of public policy are
already provided for in specific provisions
of the Act.55 Hence to confine the scope
of public policy under section 24( e) to the
existing common law heads is to make
section 24( e) nugatory. It is a trite rule of
statutory interpretation that in such a
situation the purposive approach should be
adopted. The purposive approach to the
interpretation of public policy in section
24( e) demands that the phrase be given an
interpretation which does not render the
provision nugatory.
The other reason to support the contention
that the scope of public policy should not be
limited, to or compared with, the common
457
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law concept of public policy is the use, in
that provision of the phrase "the court
regards it as ... opposed to public policy. "
This clearly allows the particular court in
question to decide ona case by case basis
whether it regards the consideration or
object of an agreement to be opposed to
public policy. It would seemthat one court
should not even be bound by what another
court in another case regards as opposed to
public policy - what more to be bound by
heads of public policy introduced in another
jurisdiction which does not' have a provision
like section 24( e). Hence it is submitted
that section 24( e) of the Contracts does
provide a Malaysian Court with the
necessary statutory mechanism to deal with
unfair terms in a consumer contract.
Unfortunately, the Federal Court in Theresa
Chong v Kin Khoon & C056 seems to think
otherwise. It was held in this case that an
agreemerit entered with a person to act a~ a
remisier who was not registered with the
Stock Exchange, was not void as coritrary to
public policy because "the contract did not
fit into any of the traditional pigeon holes of
contracts contrary to public policy".
It is most unfortunate that the more liberal
views of the Indian courts in interpretating
an identical provision in the Indian Contract
Act had not been given much weight. One
would have thought that as 'the judges in
India were interpreting an identical statutory
provision, their views ought '10 (be given
preference to the views of' 'the' English
judges.
Reddy J in the Andhra Pradesh High Court,
observed in Ratanchand Hirachand v Askar
Nawa: Jung"
The twin touchstones of
public policy are the
advancement of public good
and the prevention of public
4. 8
mischief and these questions
have to be decided by judges
not as men of legal learning
but as experienced and
enlightened members of the
community representing the
highest common factor of
public sentiments and
intelligence.
The learned judge further observed"
[I]n a modern and
progressive society with fast
changing social values and
concepts it becomes more
and more imperative to
evolve new heads of public
policy wherever necessary to
meet the demands of new
situation. Law cannot afford
to remain static.
II I
Illustrative of the liberal tradition of the
Indian judiciary, in Lily IDzite v
Munusami" the High Court of Madras held
that an exemption clause in a consumer
contract was contrary to public policy and
hence unenforceable.
In this case a saree sent by a customer to a
firm of dry cleaners was lost due to the
negligence of the cleaners. The cleaner
when sued, sought to rely on a clause
behind a receipt that they had issued to the
customer when the clothes were sent. The
clause provided that in such an event, the
cleaners would only be liable for fifty per
cent of the market value of the lost garment.
This contention was rejected by the court.
According to the learned judge60;
It appears to me to be very
clear that a term which is
prime facie opposed both to
public policy and to the
fundamental principles of the
law of contract, cannot be
In
reaffirmed hi
policy wh n
nnin R
n publi
It.
2. ndu« Influ nc
influence. A contract issaidto be induced
by 'undue influence where the' relations
subsisting between the parties are such that
one of the parties is in a position to
dominate the wiil of the other and uses that
position to 'obtain an unfair advantage over
the other." The Contracts Act links the
concept of undue influence to the cOl\cept of
unconscionability in the followulg terins:66
Where a person who is' in a
position to dominate 'the will
of another enters into a
contract with him and the
transaction appears, on the
face of it or on the evidence
adduced to be
unconscionable, the burden of
proving that the contract was
not induced by undue
influence shall lie upon the
person in a position to
dominate the will of the
other.
It is submitted that these provisions provide
the court with yet another means to strike
off unfair consumer contracts without being
stifled by common law precedents and
interpretations. As was observed by Lord
Show in Regunath Prasad v Sanju
Prasad" when dealing with an identical
provision in the Indian Contracts Act:68
It is in own view by that
section that the question
arising between the parties
falls to be considered, and
not by reference to the
legislation of other countries.
The statute to be here
construed is the [Indian]
Contract Act ... It is
accompanied with danger to
invoke as authority in an
Indian case expression which
merely connote the principles
13
i .... "':' ~.,.
which underlie a particular
English Statute and form a
guide to its interpretation.
I .
1':
'.\.
A positive development in thi~' ~rea canbe
seen in a case" pertaining to certain
guarantees given in Ja~o,\,lI'ofa, bank.,:,Jhe
guarantors sought :W' .set asi4~,a<;defl:!.:Q~~
judgement Qb~iiied by the bank in respect
of the' guarantee by alleging that the
guarantee agreements were executed under.
the exercise of undue influence by the bank.
Whilst fiQ.qing that the parties had failed to'
adduce evidence to substantiate their claim,
the learned judge recognised the possibility
that the Bank could have exercised undue
influence over the guarantors. The learned
judge in fact went further and endorsed the
decision of the Privy Council in Bank. oj
Montreal y Jane Jacque stuart &.:4nw}9,
It was held in this case that wl1en a party
enters into a contract with another and ..that
party was induced by the undue influence by
a person who. is not a party to the contract,
the contract is not enforceable. A,ccor4ing
to the learned judge": .
1)1my view this conclusion is, ,
not inconsistent with section .
.16 of the Contracts act 1l~50.
It is based on the common
law and should be considered
as a principle of law in
.'addition to what is provided
in section 16 especially in
cases of bank guarantees.
. .'
3. Fraud and Misrepresentation ;
Fraud under section i17 of the. Contracts Act,
includes certain· acts which are carried out
with intent to induce. another party to enter
into a contract. In fact the explanation to.
section 17 seems to provide that silence cap.
amount to fraud when 'it is the duty of the
person keeping . silence t(), speak';
Fraudulent misrepreseptaticn is •abo~:)
variety of fraud under section 17.
GO
However, inspite of the seemingly wid
scope of fraud under the Contract Act,
parties seldom succeed in setting a ide a
contract on this ground as a high standard of
proof is required in cases where fraUd i
alleged. 72
Misrepresentation under the Act cover Only
innocent misrepresentation. Although the
standard of proof for misrepresentation is
not as high-as for fraud, misrepresentation it
must still be shown that the consent of the
party was' caused by the misrepresentation
because it is only in such a situation that a
contract is voidable for
misrepresentation."
Conclusion
While increased judicial creativity may not
be the cure-all for unfair terms in
Malaysian consumer contracts, it is
submitted that such creativity can and will
in fact go a long way in checking and
controlling the use of such unfair term .
And even if, detailed consumer protection
legislation were to be introduced, a
'consumer-friendly' judiciary is an absolute
imperative so as to ensure that both the
tetter and more importantly, the spirit of the
legislation are observed. Furthermore even
the best and most comprehensive of statute
may still contain uncertainties, ambiguitie
and gaps which may need to be dealt with
by the judiciary.
The decision in the case of Affin Credit v
Yap Yuen Fei'4 is in fact a fine example of
how judicial creativity can be u ed t
overcome legislative sloppiness. In thi
case, a hirer alleged that a finance company
had failed to comply with section 4(1) of the
Hire Purchase Act 1967. This provi j n
required the company to serve what j
known as the Second Schedule Notice t th
hirer, before a hire purchase agreem nt i
enfered into. The Act however provided n
1
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